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Right from the start - fifty years ago - Rural Development Sociology in 
Wageningen has been distinguished by its inclination to mix practical and 
theoretical concerns in the study of rural transformation processes. For 
more than half a century now, Rural Development Sociology has taken its 
mandate - the study of agrarian development - broadly, and has focused 
on the wider technical, economic, political and social issues involved. 
One of these issues concerns the role of rural, small-scale enterprise in 
the development of so-called Third World countries. Indeed, during the 
past five decades the study of small firms and of entrepreneurial behav-
iour have come to form one of the foundations of a 'Wageningen sociol-
ogy.' All the way from van Lier's Frontier society (originally published in 
1949), through Long's Miners, peasants and entrepreneurs (1984; together 
with Roberts), van der Ploeg's Labour, markets and agricultural production 
(1990), to my own, recent work (1992, 1997), small firms have played a 
fundamental role in giving shape to a unique agenda. 
Perhaps one of the main reasons that small-scale enterprise figures so 
prominently in Rural Development Sociology at Wageningen is that their 
study permits one to address head-on the challenge of bringing together 
theory and practice. Indeed, for many years now, Wageningen sociologists 
maintain that any practice devoid of theoretical assumptions is simply 
unthinkable and that, by the same token, the practice of theorizing is as 
practical as any other activity. This position is splendidly exemplified in 
the case of the role that is attributed by policy makers and scholars alike 
to small firms in development. Thus, on the 'practical' side, policy 
makers invariably break their heads as to the appropriate measures to be 
taken in order to enhance (or diminish) small firms' share in the develop-
ment process. But these measures (whatever their form) inevitably reflect 
moral, ethical, and ideological presuppositions that are hard to imagine in 
the absence of theoretical judgements. Likewise, on the 'theoretical' side, 
the academic community is often busy devising new explanations as to the 
way small firms should be understood, and prescriptions as to how they 
should be helped or hindered (a very practical activity indeed!). In turn, 
the explanations and prescriptions become stepping stones for policy 
formulation, and so on - ad infinitum. 
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Small Firms: A Slippery Category 
As suggested in the introduction, small firms and their role in develop-
ment have been - and, presumably, will continue to be for the next 
millennium - a central issue in the discourse of policy makers. More 
recently, this interest has been spurred by data on the remarkable import-
ance of small firms' employment share in Third World countries, as well 
as by success stories about the ability of small firms to adapt to crisis 
situations in advanced economies.1 Indeed, national and international 
agencies now dedicate a growing part of their resources to catapulting the 
new key units of economic development: 'small firms' and 'the region'. 
Thus new policy initiatives and programs promoting small enterprises in 
a regional setting now saturate government agendas almost everywhere. 
The interest in small firms and their role in development has been 
paralleled in the disciplines of development economics and the sociology 
of rural development. Within these disciplines, studies of small-scale 
enterprises can be broadly assigned to one of two camps: those that are 
theoretically driven, and those that are more policy oriented. Common to 
both is the problem of 'the small': what counts as small-scale enterprise 
and what does not? And how should they be classified? Thus, for 
example, concepts such as 'small firms,' the 'informal sector,' or 'sub-
sectors' abound. Although it is true, as Douglas (1992, p. 2) comments, 
that a field of enquiry can only advance by deciding what is relevant and 
what is extraneous to it, I argue that there are several reasons for objecting 
to ethic types of classification. The main reason is that such definitions and 
classificatory schemes often hide more than that they actually clarify. And, 
worse, these classificatory schemata often go hand in hand with 
epistemological absolutism - an absolutism, I argue, which characterizes 
both policy oriented as well as theoretically driven research on small-scale 
enterprise. 
In the case of policy-oriented research, this absolutism entails that there 
is only one way of knowing, namely the instrumental one that is geared to 
act upon the known. It is an epistemology that produces a discourse on the 
economic which, in Foucault's (1979) terms, attempts to construct and 
domesticate the identities of economic subjects. It is a discourse that is 
normally identified with the state, corporate agencies, NGO's and a range 
of other participants in (rural) development. A second, and arguably more 
important, effect is that categories and identities of economic subjects are 
thereby constructed. These are later used to intervene - to control the 
economy 'at a distance' (Latour 1987) - through tax legislation, specific 
accounting techniques, or structural adjustment programmes that impinge 
upon micro- and small-scale firms. But this absolutist epistemology is not 
only a way of knowing that shapes its object in order to be able to act on 
it. As Law (1991, p. 3) suggests in the context of studies of science and 
technology, it is also an epistemology that tells us - sometimes descriptive-
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ly, more often prescriptively - how to go about gathering knowledge. This, 
in effect, implies taking on board normative .' . . 'tool boxes' consisting 
of frameworks for classifying data, procedures for conducting oneself in 
the field, and methodological instruments for data analysis that are not 
linked to crucial research questions and theoretical concerns' (Long 1992, 
footnote page 15). The danger of some kind of methodological empiricism 
looms large, then, in policy-oriented studies of small-scale enterprise. 
In the same fashion, most theoretically informed research on small-scale 
economic activity takes the side of the knower - though for different 
reasons. Here, methodological canons flow from the epistemological need 
to accord primacy to the 'external' forces that are seen to constitute the 
context within which small-scale enterprise develops. Generally, this takes 
the form of conceptualizing 'capitalism', 'industrialization', 'globaliza-
tion' and the like as the driving forces, whilst small-scale enterprises are 
portrayed as being the driven and only able to 'fine-tune' to local intri-
cacies. Clearly, within this view, small-scale economic activities only 
matter in so far they are connected, related, and translated in terms of 
their importance for supporting or refuting the 'laws' of grand narra-
tives. And, like the epistemology of the policy-oriented camp, it tells us 
what the rules of method should be: the question of how, empirically, 
small-scale entrepreneurs shape, and are shaped by their socio-technical 
environment is abandoned or, at best, relegated to a secondary level of 
analysis. 
What is needed, then, is another mode of understanding small firms, a 
vocabulary that brings forward that which remains hidden by slippery 
ethic concepts and absolutist epistemological precepts. An idiom that does 
justice to the heterogeneity of firms. A language that gives priority to the 
way in which this heterogeneity is constructed, and which involves mani-
fold struggles, negotiations and accommodations over a broad range of 
issues that are crucial for the operation of firms. In short, a vocabulary of 
problem-solving that is willing to tackle head-on the challenge of under-
standing the organizing practices that arise from actors' wills to bring about 
desired changes in the running of their enterprises (Long and van der 
Ploeg 1994). 
Small Firms and Development: Old Ways of Talking 
Reconceptualizing the dynamics of small firms entails contesting a number 
of received notions about the role accorded to small firms in development. 
Historically speaking, explanations for this role diverge, depending on the 
specific model of the actor that is espoused. Basically, sociologists and 
anthropologists saw the role of small firms from the vantage point of homo 
sociologicus - the actor whose behaviour is norm - or rule-guided and thus, 
in principle, embedded in the daily flow of social relations (Granovetter 
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1985). This position entailed that economy and society evolved from local, 
existing relations of reciprocity and redistribution. These relations were 
seen to form the basis for the operation of small firms, and provided them 
with decisive advantages in situations of structural instability and erratic 
market conditions - a characteristic of Third World economies. Thus by 
the mid-1950s, strong arguments in favour of small enterprises had already 
been confirmed; these included labour intensiveness, adaptability, advan-
tageous utilization of local production factors, reduced dependence on 
imports, and their role in providing a seed-bed for indigenous entrepre-
neurial development (Schumpeter 1934). 
Economists, for their part, explained the role of small firms in develop-
ment by adhering to the assumption from classical economics of the 
existence of homo economicus - the rational, atomized, self-interested 
individual who is minimally affected by social relations in his/her market 
competitive behaviour. This assumption led to the view that the market 
was separate and autonomous from social conditioning. This position -
which has been labelled as the 'market paradigm' - entailed that the 
market was the dominant form of social behaviour, and that in fact social 
life was itself a subproduct of market interaction (Mingione 1991, p. 5). 
This in turn meant that any form of economic activity which was defined 
by social obligations was sub-optimal, and thus only a temporary stage on 
the way to a 'natural' state of affairs in which economic transactions 
were governed by the rational calculations of individual actors pursuing 
their own gain. 
In the context of theories of economic development, especially in Third 
World regions, the force of this analytic model based on the market 
paradigm proved formidable, paving the way for the discursive construc-
tion of so-called 'underdeveloped economies.'2 Indeed, the model was 
pivotal for the division of a country's economy and social life into two 
sectors: one modern, the other traditional. From this point of view, develop-
ment consisted of the progressive encroachment of the modern upon the 
traditional. According to this understanding, rapid modernization and a 
'take-off' (Rostow 1963) into self-sustained growth could only be 
achieved by a strategy of accelerated industrialization based on large, 
capital-intensive, enterprises that utilized modern technology. This image 
soon found its way into national governments, the United Nations, the 
ILO, the World Bank and the IMF. 
The effects of this conception were immense since tradition was equated 
with economic backwardness. As a consequence, the 'traditional' sector 
was at best seen as playing a transitory role leading towards a higher 
stage of development - and thus only needed in countries that were 
passing through an early phase of industrialization. It was expected, or 
hoped, that in the course of economic maturation, small firms would 
gradually decline in favour of large-scale businesses. At worst (Lewis 1954, 
quoted in Escobar 1995), the so-called 'traditional' sector was thought to 
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make no contribution whatsoever to the process of development and 
should, therefore, be obliterated as soon as possible if economic growth 
was to occur. 
By the early 1970s it became evident, however, that something was 
wrong with the prediction that development based upon the moderniz4-
ation model would bring about equity and progress for all. Vast and 
growing discrepancies in real-term incomes both within but also between 
countries became more apparent. Together with this trend, a large increase 
in the number of small-scale economic activities co-existing alongside large 
enterprises could be observed. This of course posed an insurmountable 
problem to proponents of the market paradigm (Mingione 1991). Indeed, 
for a large and growing part of Third World populations it was only the 
fact that market relations were deeply embedded in relations of reciprocity 
and redistribution that made life minimally bearable. This evidence 
brought about the collapse of the model of atomized, individual competi-
tive behaviour as independent from the moral, ethical, and religious 
principles inherent in local social institutions. As it turned out, the very 
idea (and idealist position) that an analytic concept such as homo 
economicus could control or grasp an object situated 'out there' in 'The 
Economy' was doomed to failure. Consequently, new theories were 
designed, tested, overhauled, provided with fashionable neo- or post-
prefixes, or simply abandoned to their fate on the 'garbage heap of 
history.' 
Today, when opening the file on theories of small firms, one can charac-
terize three different positions. A first line of (policy-oriented) research 
stresses the dynamic and sheltered potential for economic expansion and 
employment inherent in small firms. Indeed, at the beginning of the 1970s, 
there was an increasing awareness that most developing economies could 
not incorporate the growing urban labour force into the labour market -
despite the fact that some countries were achieving prolonged periods of 
high growth rates. This realization was accompanied by a reemergence of 
the issue of the role of small firms in the development process. The 
increased attention to small-scale economic activities reached a climax with 
the concept of the 'informal sector,' promoted by the ILO's Kenya 
report (1972),3 and referring to those small-scale economic activities charac-
terized by 'family ownership, small scale of operations, use of labour-
intensive production methods and adapted technology, reliance on 
indigenous resources, unprotected labour, ease of entry and unregulated 
and competitive markets' (ILO 1972, p. 6). 
Alternatively, a second line of (theoretical) research emphasizes the 
explanation and/or understanding of small-scale economic activities in 
relation to capitalist and traditional modes of production; as well as the 
structural position of small firms in regimes of accumulation and regula-
tion - both in the First and the Third World. This approach replaces the 
formal/informal dichotomy with a model conforming to the variable 
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articulation of capitalist and non-capitalist forms and modes of production 
within the context of concrete social formations (Prattis 1987, p. 31).4 The 
main argument here is that petty or small-scale enterprises cannot repro-
duce themselves without some involvement in commodity circuits, and 
that the general 'logic' governing economic life and livelihood strategies 
is that of capitalism (Long 1986, pp. 12-13). This insight appeared to be 
corroborated by a wide body of evidence stemming from the patterns of 
uneven growth that characterized the Third World in the 1960s and early 
1970s, and which had produced an expansion and diversification of 
different forms of small-scale enterprise which could not be interpreted as 
transitional or residual (MacEwen-Scott 1986, p. 3). The major achievement 
of this approach is that it contradicted the prediction that small-scale, non-
capitalist enterprises would in the long run wither away in the face of 
capitalist expansion. 
A third, and more recent line of research on small firms is that advo-
cated by proponents of the flexible specialization paradigm who take a 
middle-of-the-road position between practical and theoretical concerns. The 
model of flexible specialization was originally advanced by Piore and 
Sabel (1984), who contrasted it with the model of industrialization based 
on a Fordist type of production organization. These authors argue that 
deteriorating industrial performance in a number of Western countries 
results from the limits of rigid, mass production systems, in which mass 
goods are produced using standardized machinery and unskilled workers. 
As an alternative, Piore and Sabel propose the flexible specialization 
model. In particular, they emphasize the decentralization of big factory 
chains and redeployment of productive forces into small units that can 
take advantage of flexible technologies. This, they argue, would enable 
crisis-ridden economies to react to ceaseless changes by introducing 
manufacturing systems capable of making specialized goods using multi-
purpose, flexible machinery and skilled labour (Hirst and Zeitlin 1991, p. 
2). Despite its Western genealogy, the application of the flexible specializ-
ation model for the Third World has been explicitly discussed by Schmitz 
(1990) and a number of colleagues (Pedersen 1989, Späth 1993; Sverrisson 
1993).5 
Some Shortcomings in the Theoretical Discourse on Small Firms and 
Development: Essentialism, Dualism, Reductionism 
In spite of the advances booked in the theoretical understanding of the 
role of small firms in development, a number of epistemological assump-
tions made by the different positions have been too easily overlooked and 
consequently escaped systematic scrutiny. In fact, the three new theories 
dealing with small firms discussed above are, to a greater or lesser extent, 
based on the same triad of assumptions that were made by the moderniz-
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ation model they criticize. The first assumption is often referred to as 
essentialism. As Woolgar (1988, p. 55) contends, essentialism underlies the 
metaphor of scientific discovery, 
' . . the idea of dis-covering, [which is] precisely that of uncovering 
and revealing something which had been there all along. One removes 
the covers and thereby exposes the thing for what it is; one pulls back 
the curtains on the facts. The image derives in part from the notion of 
geographical discovery. One travels to a distant place and finds (comes 
upon or otherwise stumbles over) what was already there. The crucial 
part is the prior existence of the discovered object.' 
A case in point is the discourse that has constructed the notion of 'under-
developed areas'. For example - and following classical economics -
development economists assumed that 'Progress' was an attribute of 
'Nature.' In other words, progress was seen as a natural state of affairs.6 
This essentialist idea in turn prescribed the task of science as that of 
'discovering' the pattern in which 'progress' unfolded, and recom-
mending policies that would hasten its inevitable attainment (Greenfield 
et al. 1979, p. 6). Note, however, what this entails. Linearity is built into the 
analysis by equating economic progress with Nature; this linearity has the 
effect of bringing about a lack of fit between economic discourse on the 
economic subjects, and the practices of these subjects themselves. Indeed, 
flesh-and-blood social actors always present essentialist discourses with a 
significant surplus of meaning which cannot be explained away by elegant 
theoretical models. 
Crude essentialism, however, is not the exclusive right of theories of 
economic modernization. The articulationist school could just as well be 
taken to task. Authors such as Meillassoux (1981) - who tries to explain 
the survival of pre- and non-capitalist relations of production as a struc-
tured feature of capitalism - make the essentialist assumption that some-
thing like 'capitalist' and 'precapitalist' relations of production actually 
exist, independent of the scientific gaze. In more or less the same fashion, 
studies of the informal sector and flexibly specialized firms make the 
essentialist assumption that formal and informal sectors, Fordist and post-
Fordist production regimes exist, and that it is their task to discover and 
document their changes and transformations. Yet what does not dawn on 
proponents of such models is the possibility that 'essences' such as 
'capitalism,' 'formal sectors' or 'post-Fordism' only reflect their clas-
sificatory practices, rather than the 'actual' or 'objective' character of 
the phenomena they wish to explain. After all, before one can meaning-
fully start talking about such essences as 'the economy,' one needs to 
make visible the invisible world of exchanges. As Latour (1990, p. 38) 
argues, 'the economy' is plainly invisible as long as cohorts of inquirers 
and inspectors have not filled in long questionnaires, as long as answers 
have not been punched onto cards, treated by computers, and analyzed by 
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economists. It is only at the end of all this that an aggregate hybrid called 
'the economy' emerges from the piles of charts and lists. Existence, then, 
is prior the essence: before 'capitalism,' 'Fordism' or 'informal sec-
tors' become essences, they need to be constructed. 
A second - and related - assumption often made in theories about the 
role of small firms in economic development is that two different types of 
economies exist within one single spatial configuration. This is usually 
called dualism. Clear-cut examples include explanations that locate small-
scale economic activities within the realm of 'the traditional' (Boeke 
1953), the 'bazaar economy' (Geertz 1963) or the 'informal sector' (ILO 
1972), while large firms are seen to be located in the so-called 'modern' 
or 'formal' sectors. Common in these dualist theories is the idea that 
each segment of the economy is homogeneous and possesses its own 
principles for the organization of production, distribution and exchange. 
The case of the articulationist school7 goes someway in sidestepping the 
pitfalls of crude dualism by treating capitalist and non-capitalist relations 
of production as relational categories. Nevertheless, the perspective remains 
dualist by taking capitalist and non-capitalist relations as a point of depar-
ture - no matter how relational its treatment thereof. Likewise, the flexible 
specialization model is essentially dualist in its aim to demonstrate the 
displacement of mass production by flexible specialization as the dominant 
technological paradigm. This, as Sayer and Walker (1992, p. 199, quoted 
in Murdoch 1995, p. 741) argue, hinders recognition of the fact that .' . . 
industry has always combined flexibilities and inflexibilities' and that 
such combinations 'cannot be grasped by inflexible dualistic frameworks 
which counterpose the old as the inflexible to the new as flexible.' Here, 
indeed, we find one more instance in which economic subjects (industry; 
firms) confront theoretical models with a surplus of meaning. 
It would certainly be fruitless to negate the impact that dualistic 
conceptualizations have had on social relations at a global level. Indeed, 
the divides are painstakingly enforced by international organizations, 
economists, bureaucrats and even the police. But the point is this: the 
divides created by dualist theories do not represent any natural bound-
aries. They may be useful for teaching or intervening in one form or 
another, but they certainly do not provide any explanation. On the con-
trary: these divides are themselves the very things to be explained (Latour 
1990, p. 20). 
Next to essentialism and dualism, another common assumption in need 
of démystification is that of reductionism. Reductionism is closely related 
to the modern-traditional dichotomy in the sense that, by splitting one 
pole from the other, one of them (often the traditional) is made remote or 
reduced.8 However, as Law (1994, p. 12) stresses, one should note what is 
entailed in reductionism: 
'First, you need to draw a line between two classes of phenomena by 
distinguishing those that drive from those that are driven. And second 
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you claim that the behaviour of the latter is explained - often you say 
caused - by the actions of the former. So the danger is this: that you . 
. . [drive] a wedge between those that are doing the driving and the 
rest. And (this is the real problem) the former get described differently, 
or not at all. So reductionism often, perhaps usually, makes distinctions 
that may come to look strangely like dualisms.' 
Reductionism becomes apparent in the flexible specialization model and 
in most studies of the informal sector. In the case of the former, the 
'driver' takes the specific form of the political, economic and institutional 
environment which has been constructed by 'large private or public enter-
prises, and which is rarely supportive and often discriminatory (e.g., Späth 
1994). Here the institutional environment is already identified as the 
driver, and the internal organization of the firm thus automatically 
becomes the driven. Similarly, most informal sector studies see informality 
as dependent and subordinate - or indeed a response to - the formal 
sector. Here, again, a wedge is placed between the driver (conditions in 
the formal sector) and the driven (economic behaviour in the so-called 
informal sector). In the same vein, within the articulationist school it is 
argued that market forces - in the form of commoditized relations -
increasingly shape individual economic decisions (e.g., Bernstein 1986; 
Hart 1982). Once again, a lever is forced between the driver (market 
forces) and the driven (decision making). This is not inconsequential since 
such an assumption deals inadequately with the non-commoditized side 
of the equation, introducing an asymmetry into the analysis which, in the 
end, leads to an unwarrantably linear view of change. A related conse-
quence of conceiving of commoditization as the motor of change and 
decision making is that the sphere of production is prioritized over and 
above the work and the networks needed to sustain and reproduce house-
hold and/or enterprise labour, the social organization of consumption, or 
the importance of gender relations in the actual structuring of the labour 
process (MacEwen-Scott 1986; Pahl 1985; Whatmore 1988, p. 248). Another 
effect entailed in reducing individual decision making to 'market forces' 
is that much of the cultural and ideological dimension of petty commodity 
production, distribution and exchange is made invisible. Moreover, if 
commoditization is seen as the driving force, and actors are assumed to be 
no more than passive mediators in the process of commoditization itself, 
one can never bring into the picture what the commoditization of the 
different moments of production, exchange and consumption might mean 
for the enterprising practices of the actors concerned (Long 1986). Blind-
ness to these issues leads to the unqualified conclusion that market inte-
gration opens the road to the individualization and atomization of the 
social environment of small-scale entrepreneurs who, consequently, only 
maintain commoditized extra-household relations. In this case, 
reductionism prevents one from taking into account inter-household 
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cooperative strategies, or the way in which actors help one another in 
organizing their respective enterprises, often through non-commoditized 
relationships. 
Towards a Reconceptualization of Small Firms: Collectifs and the 
Fluidity of Context and Content 
To summarize the previous sections: in order to reconceptualize small 
firms, it is necessary to sidestep two crucial problems inherent in both 
economic and sociological approaches. The first problem concerns the 
debate between formalists, who maintain a preeminence for homo 
oeconomicus, and substantivists, who persist in championing the salience 
of homo sociologicus. This dualistic debate, which runs like a thread through 
the discussion of the role of small firms in development, needs to be 
replaced by a perspective that favours the continuity between the econ-
omic, social, political and, in addition, the technical domains. These 
domains or spheres need to be analytically brought together in order to 
open up new theoretical gateways. What this means is that it is not 
enough to look at the social (economic, political, religious) features that tie 
people together, but that we must also look at the technical aspects that 
hold together the social. 
To go beyond this first problem - the separation between the 'social' 
and the 'non-social' - one needs to acknowledge that this division is first 
of all in the minds of analysts - analysts who, instead of following entre-
preneurs as they weave their way through a disorderly horde of human 
and non-human allies, prefer to make up a double register where, on one 
side, humans are paired with humans and, on the other, all the non-
human elements of the strategies they have to explain are lumped 
together. To get rid of this fixed ontology which is spanned, on the one 
hand, by people and, on the other, by things, I advocate a body of work 
developed in the context of the sociology of science: actor-network theory. 
Following Bijker and Law (1992, pp. 12-13), this theory represents an 
attempt to find a neutral vocabulary to describe and explain the actions of 
what Law (1987) dubs 'heterogeneous engineers.' The main idea is that 
these 'heterogeneous engineers,' such as small-scale entrepreneurs, build 
disorderly networks composed of social, economic, political and technical 
elements,9 and that it makes little sense to separate a priori the human from 
the non-human elements of these networks. 
Actor-network theory, then, helps to avoid making the commonsense 
assumption that people (entrepreneurs) and things are naturally occurring 
categories - the first endowed with agency, the second devoid of it. Thus, 
as Latour (1994, p. 46) proposes, purposeful action and intentionality are 
not properties of objects, but neither are they properties of human actors. 
Rather, they are the properties of institutions, of collectifs}0 
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To argue for the incorporation of non-humans into the analysis of 
collectifs, however, poses its own obstacles. Witness, for example, the 
debate between sociologists and economists on issues that have to do with 
the relationship between technology and society. This debate, driven by 
proponents of 'technological determinism'11 and 'social determinism,'12 
can go on forever as long as the common assumption is made that both 
society and technology exist independently of each other. Similarly, there 
is a fierce battle underway between British and French sociologists in the 
sociology of science13 over the issue of where to place the exact divide 
between humans and non-humans.14 If one assumes - with the French -
that no two different ontological categories (people and things) exist but 
that, rather, humans and non-humans are fused in collectifs, then surely 
'traditional' definitions of collectives or of institutions (such as small 
firms) are of little help for the simple reason that they cannot accommo-
date the constitutive role of non-humans. 
The second problem one should address when reconceptualizing small 
firms is that of the triad of assumptions usually made: essentialism, 
dualism, and reductionism. Here, too, actor-network theory may offer 
useful insights. For example, it avoids making essentialist assumptions 
about a backdrop of social, economic or technical factors: it says that the 
backdrop is something that is itself built in the course of building a 
network. Likewise, it suggests that it is misconceived to think that entre-
preneurs operate in a world given by naturally occurring (dual) categories 
or essences such as 'content' or 'context.' Also, it says that it is too 
simple to argue that context is shaped by, or influences, content (and vice 
versa).15 
As I argued above, the danger of essentialism (the existence of a context 
and a content that set the stage for entrepreneurial activities and which 
can be known a priori) is that it easily develops into reductionism of one 
form or another. Thus context 'drives' content (agents can only make 
local adjustments in a context established long ago), or content 'steers' 
context (interacting agents continuously create unplanned events which 
cannot be explained by virtue of what happened before or what occurs 
elsewhere). To counter the danger of reductionism, I suggest that one 
treats small firms as 'balancing acts' in which social and technical 
elements both from 'within' and from 'without' the firm are placed 
side by side. 
Bridging the Gap: Global Networks, Local Networks, and Obligatory 
Points of Passage 
As stated above, the idea that one can follow small firms or entrepreneur-
ial projects as they unfold in a given context that is separate from the 
content of the projects themselves is problematic. The strategies of firms 
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often, if not always, turn first around the creation of a distinction between 
inside and outside, and second upon ensuring that whatever is inside 
becomes indispensable for those on the outside in a way that is analogous 
to one of the main findings of the history and sociology of science (Bijker 
and Law 1992, p. 304). What is needed is thus an analytical tool that 
allows for a description of the interrelatedness of the trajectories of firms 
and the co-evolution of their socio-technical context and content. Below, 
I develop a network metaphor to understand these processes. 
According to Law and Callon (1992, p. 46), the trajectories of projects 
can be seen as a function of three interrelated factors. The first function is 
the ability of a project to construct and preserve a global network that is 
intended to contribute resources to the project. These resources may be of 
various kinds: money, permits, political support, machinery and so on. The 
global network provides these resources because it expects a return. When 
a global network is successfully put together, the entrepreneur obtains 
room for manoeuvre (a negotiation space) in which he or she can experi-
ment at will - as long as the possibility of a return remains present. 
The second function is the capacity of the project to assemble a local 
network by mobilizing the means contributed by the global network.16 
Again, the purpose of using these resources is to be able to reciprocate to 
actors from the global network (this may generally take the form of some 
sort of material or economic return, but need not necessarily be so: cultural 
objects of symbolic value may also flow from the local to the global 
network). If successfully constructed, a local network thus allows its 
originator(s) to experiment with and control the means provided by the 
global network, with the ultimate goal of offering a return of some kind 
to the different actors composing the global network. 
The third factor is the degree to which an entrepreneurial project suc-
ceeds in imposing itself as an obligatory point of passage between the global 
and the local network. This means that, if successful, the project should 
first have the ability to shape and mobilize the local network and that, 
second, the project is able to exercise control over all exchanges between 
the local and the global network. In other words, if actors from the global 
network count on or have an interest in a promised final return, then the 
producers of this return (and the material, economic, or cultural return 
itself) become an obligatory point of passage. If unsuccessful, that is, if 
unable to impose itself as an obligatory point of passage, an entrepreneur-
ial project cannot profit from the local network, and nor does it have 
command over the use and mobilization of resources from the global 
network (which may ultimately be withdrawn). 
Apart of their theoretical relevance, the notions of global and local 
networks and obligatory points of passage are also of practical importance 
for they permit an evaluation of the viability of specific firms or networks 
of firms. More precisely, these terms offer the advantage of avoiding 
observer-defined accounts of viability. Thus one can sidestep economists' 
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definitions of viability which refer to a break-even point, or sociologists' 
cherished notions - difficult to operationalize - of 'social security' or the 
'potential' of firms to reproduce themselves in time. Nor does one have 
to deal with tortuous definitions of 'sustainability' - as is usual within 
'green' circles. In addition, the notions of obligatory points of passage 
and global and local networks allow viability to be conceived of as a 
temporal condition: whenever support by a global or a local network is 
withdrawn a firm ceases to act as an obligatory point of passage, and 
looses viability. 
Morphology of Collectifs: Convergence and Momentum 
Global and local networks - collectifs - may stand in a specific relationship 
with one another, that is, they may be differently articulated. Another way 
of putting this is to say that collectifs may have multiple morphologies. 
Thus the entities making up these collectifs may converge or diverge, be 
more or less standardized, and their relationships may be long- or short-
lived to different degrees. 
A useful concept for estimating the morphology of a collectif is that of 
convergence^7 or the degree of integration of a collectif. In a situation of 
convergence, for example, the activities of all actors from the global and 
the local networks can easily be linked to each other and each actor can in 
principle mobilize other actors. In other words, any actor belonging to the 
collectif, whatever her position within it, 
'. . . can at any time mobilize all the network's skills without having 
to get involved with costly adaptations, translations or decoding. The 
[collectif] as a whole is behind any one of the actors who make it up.' 
(Callon 1992b, p. 223) 
Convergence within a collectif, of course, does not mean that actors con-
sciously work towards a common objective. Rather, it means that actors 
have sufficiently fine-tuned their activities so as to make them compatible 
with those of other actors from the same collectif. This, of course, need not 
always be the case. In such a situation, then, it would be more meaningful 
to speak of divergence: cooperation between actors is unlikely or limited. 
This latter situation - divergence - can be illustrated through the example 
of the street food vendor in Mexico (see Verschoor 1997). After having 
eaten at a stall, a client develops intestinal disorder and complains to the 
food stall vendor. Here the vendor has a choice between three modes of 
action. First, he may take responsibility for the damaged intestines by 
acknowledging the cause of the complaint. A second mode of action - the 
one followed most often - is for the vendor to contest the accusation: what 
makes his client so sure that the vendor's food is responsible for the 
disorder? Could it not have been something else? Did the client wash her 
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hands before eating? In this (second) case, the clients' definition of the 
vendor as the responsible party is contested, and does not converge with 
the definition of the problem according to the vendor. The translation is 
thus incomplete. The third alternative is for the vendor to accept the 
charge - for example because more customers have come to him with the 
same complaints - but delegate responsibility to others within the collectif. 
For example, the vendor can take the complaint to the abattoir. There, the 
criticism can only be translated into a solvable problem if there is a man-
agement system that allows for tracking down the origin of the meat sold 
to food stall vendors. Since this is not usually the case, turning the com-
plaint into a solvable problem is ruled out, and the client's accusation 
simply does not find a target. Here the interdefinitions of the actors 
involved conflict with one another: the actors participate in a dispersed 
network. As a consequence, cooperation between them may be unlikely or 
limited. 
Small firms, then, participate to varying degrees in collectifs, which may 
have different degrees of convergence. In order to gauge these degrees of 
convergence, one can use the related concepts of translation and 
coordination (Callon 1991,1992). By translation is meant the process where-
by global and local networks are composed and obligatory points of 
passage created - in other words, the process that creates a shared space 
that was absent before the initiation of a project. 
The process of translation can, for analytical reasons, be separated into 
four moments (Callon 1986): problematization, intéressement, enrolment and 
mobilization. Problematization is the process by which a project becomes 
indispensable to global actors by defining the nature and the problems of 
the latter, and then suggesting that these can be resolved by following the 
path of action suggested by the project. The next step, intéressement, are 
those methods by which the project attempts to impose and stabilize the 
identity of the global actors defined in the problematization. In other 
words, intéressement is the process of translating the images and concerns 
of a project into that of a global network, and then trying to discipline or 
control that translation in order to stabilize an actor-network (Star 1991, p. 
33). As already stated, these actor-networks include people, the built 
environment, machines, signs and symbols, inscriptions, and so on. 
Intéressement, however, does not necessarily lead to alliances, that is, to 
actual enrolment. Intéressement achieves enrolment if it is successful. 
Describing enrolment is thus to describe the group of multilateral negoti-
ations, trials of strength and tricks that accompany the intéressements and 
enable them to succeed. Enrolment, in other words, is the successful 
distribution of roles as proposed (and most probably changed) by the 
project in the initial problematization. Finally, if intéressement is success-
ful, that is, if enrolment has been achieved, then one can speak of the 
mobilization of the network of entities involved. Put somewhat differently, 
mobilization means the successful translation of a network of entities: a 
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global network provides resources for an expected return, a local network 
is created that allows some room for manoeuvre for the project to supply 
this expected return, and the project itself becomes an obligatory point of 
passage, that is, it is able to exercise control over all exchanges between 
the local and the global networks. Translation, then, involves all those 
methods by which a specific definition of a problematic situation - its 
character, cause and probable solution - is construed and made indispens-
able for others to follow. 
Next to translation, a second concept that is useful to measure the 
degree of convergence of a collectif is what Callon (1991,1992) terms forms 
of coordination or translation regimes. This refers to the existing set of rules 
and regulations that have been produced in past interaction, and which 
impinge on the character of any collectif. So, for example, who or what 
counts as an actor, or who or what may speak on behalf of others, is 
normally laid down in a series of rules and conventions that range from 
formal law to tacit and culturally specific practices. Some of these rules 
and conventions are of a general character. Examples could be the passing 
of a Federal Health Law, the requirements to obtain a loan from a bank, 
or the conditions of payment for merchandise specified in a contract. Yet 
other rules and norms are of a more 'local' character, that is, they lose 
their validity outside the collectif that produced them. Examples could be 
agreements between producers of specific commodities about pricing 
policy; the creation of local organizational forms such as associations or 
cooperatives; or the technical norms concerning the production of particu-
lar goods. 
The distinction between general and local rules and conventions is 
important because it helps one to discern the specific form of coordination 
of a collectif. So, for example, Callon (1992, p. 87) suggests using the term 
weak coordination to 'characterize a network which has not added on any 
local rules and procedures to conventions generally followed at any given 
moment.' Inversely, the term strong coordination can be used to denote a 
collectif shaped both by local and general rules. 
It should be clear from the above that a combination of the concepts of 
translation and translation regimes can be helpful devices for 'measur-
ing' the degree of convergence of a given network. Indeed, the stronger 
the translation and the form of coordination of a given collectif, 
'. . . the more the actors composing it work together in a common enter-
prise, without their status as actors being under constant challenge. This 
does not mean that everyone does the same thing. Rather it quite 
simply means that any one actor's activities fit in easily with those of 
the other actors, despite their heterogeneity.' (Callon 1992, p. 87; 
emphasis added). 
Next to convergence, a concept that is of central importance to gauge the 
morphology of a network is that of momentum. This concept refers back to 
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that of translation, and suggests that the latter has been 'locked into 
place'. According to Callon (1991, pp. 140-50), the momentum (which he 
terms 'irreversibility') of a translation depends on two factors: (a) the 
extent to which it is subsequently impossible to go back to a point where 
the translation was only one amongst others; and (b) the extent to which 
it shapes and determines subsequent translations. 
To exemplify the notion of momentum, let us take the example of a 
producer of a specific good who opens a credit line at a bank. Once the 
operation is legally sanctioned by some form or document, it becomes 
difficult if not outright impossible for the parties to withdraw from the 
agreement and go back to the beginning of the transaction - when mul-
tiple alternatives for obtaining credit may have been open for the pro-
ducer. At the same time, the credit line may shape future decisions: 
specific goals that were impossible to achieve without credit can now be 
pursued.18 
In a sense, then, momentum denotes the way in which the past engages 
the future.19 More generally, momentum has to do with the evolutionary 
process in which a project passes from a stage of uncertainty to a stage in 
which certain trajectories stabilize. Put differently: it is how heterogeneity 
makes place for homogeneity. This is often the case when a project is 
successful, that is, able to present a result: when ideas (which are debat-
able) make way for finished objects (which are less debatable). 
Prime Movers, Distributed Action and Black-Boxed Actors 
So far, I have argued that the notions of global and local networks and 
obligatory points of passage can help one to illuminate issues to do with 
the dynamics of small entrepreneurial projects without having to resort to 
externalist explanations. One important additional point is that it is not 
necessarily people, but also things that could be the obligatory points of 
passage between a global and local network. This point can be generalized 
through the notion of intermediary. As the etymology of the word implies, 
inter-mediaries mediate between two or more parties, thereby constructing 
a whole, a common space, a network or a collectif. 
The notion of intermediary is useful because it brings together the poles 
of Economy and Society (the separation of which, I argued, inhibits rather 
than illuminates the practices of small firms). How is this possible? Callon 
(1991) suggests that this can be achieved by juxtaposing the insights of 
economists and sociologists. 'The Economy,' for example, as defined by 
economists, is that domain in which people are brought into relationship 
with one another through the exchange of things. Translated into my 
analytical framework, a project often relates a local and a global network 
via a product. According to Callon (1991, p. 134), this situation can be 
generalized by means of the notion of an intermediary, which 'is anything 
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passing between actors which defines the relationship between them.' Examples 
of intermediaries abound: texts, skills, money, and all sorts of technical 
artifacts. The list is endless. 
Contrary to economics, in sociological theory 'Society' (the behaviour 
of actors) can only be understood when it is set in a context that has been 
built by the actors themselves. Thus sociologists speak of roles and func-
tional prerequisites, agents and fields. In fact, or so these disparate socio-
logical theories suggest, no actor can be isolated from the relationships in 
which he or she is implicated. What does this mean in terms of creating 
a common space between Economy and Society? Here Callon (1991, p. 135) 
presses the point to its logical conclusion:20 
'Economists teach us that interaction involves the circulation of inter-
mediaries. Sociologists teach us that actors can only be defined in terms 
of their relationships. But these are two parts of the same puzzle, and 
if we fit them together we find the solution. This is that actors define one 
another in interaction - in the intermediaries that they put into circulation. '21 
When successfully translated, actors are able to communicate through the 
intermediaries that circulate between them and which define both of them 
simultaneously. For example, any product passing hands between a 
vendor and his client simultaneously defines the identity of both in that 
encounter: the vendor as the seller of a service, the client as the buyer of 
it. In this case, the degree of convergence is strong because the translations 
(both by the vendor and by the client) are relatively similar. Of course, 
successful translation need not always take place, or may only be weak in 
character. Taking the same example, this would be the case when the 
client doubts the quality or the value of the product and refuses to buy it. 
To summarize: entrepreneurial projects try to construct and set in 
motion local and global networks, and they may become obligatory points 
of passage between the two networks through the circulation of intermedi-
aries. This, however, leaves one with the problem of who or what is the 
prime mover of the collectif. Asking who the prime mover of action is, 
however, is a matter of convention, and depends on who or what one 
chooses to follow. Indeed, authorship of action can in principle be 
attributed to different entities. Action, I suggest, is a polycentric process. 
Likewise, within our framework the notion of 'actor' does not refer back 
to some fixed essence (such as, for example, the capacity to 'have' 
agency). Rather the identity of an actor is relational, and refers back to 
notions of sociality and materiality. Indeed, as Latour (1994, p. 33) sug-
gests, neither subject nor object are fixed entities. Both change their prop-
erties when they become a gathering, a collectif, a hybrid actor made up of 
people-and-things.22 Responsibility for action is, in other words, distrib-
uted, and not caused by a human (or by a non-human, for that matter). 
Action is rather a composition of relations between associated entities. As 
Latour (1994, p. 35) succinctly puts it: 
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'The attribution to one actor of the role of prime mover in no way 
weakens the necessity of a composition of forces to explain the action. It 
is by mistake, or unfairness, that our headlines read, 'Man flies,' 
'Woman goes into space.' Flying is a property of the whole association 
of entities that includes airports and planes, launch pads and ticket 
counters. B-52s do not fly, the U.S. Air Force flies. Action is simply not 
a property of humans but of an association of actants. . .' 
But how come we do not see these compositions for what they are, that is, 
impure hybrids of the social, the technical, the political, the economic and 
all the rest? Why is it so difficult to talk in terms of these collectifs? How 
is it that we prefer to make reference to punctualized actions, to black-
boxes, instead of describing the complexities that are part and parcel of 
collectifs? Following Law (1992) this is because, in practice, network pat-
terns may become routines. For example, not all elements involved in an 
exchange between a producer and a consumer need to be defined all over 
again in each routinized exchange encounter. The exchange can (and is) 
simplified, black-boxed. All that matters is that the exchange works. Once 
simplified, the exchange (the actor-network) can be assumed to act as a 
disengaged block - a punctualization that enables a language of 'prime 
movers', of 'causes' and 'effects'. Apparently simple elements thus in 
fact masquerade as the collectif of which they are an effect.23 
How can we open up these punctualized compositions, these black-
boxed collectifs? Our answer is: through description, through the opening 
up, the exposition, of the trajectories of networks that end up being punc-
tualized. This means that one has to follow entrepreneurs, politicians and 
so on, in their work of defining the characteristics of their objects (such as 
products or laws). It means that we have to follow actors' hypotheses 
about the entities that make up the world into which their objects are to 
be inserted. Indeed, a large part of the work of entrepreneurs is that of 
inscribing their vision about the world in the intermediaries they bring into 
circulation. Following Akrich (1992), the end product of this work can be 
termed a 'script' or 'scenario.' It may, of course, be that in practice 
actors do not wish to perform the roles set out for them by the entrepre-
neur, since they may define their roles differently. If this is the case, then 
the envisaged intermediaries never become real. So the point is to ascertain 
whether entrepreneurial projects become real or remain unreal. This 
problem can be approached by following the negotiations between entre-
preneurs and potential users, and studying how the results of such negoti-
ations are translated and inscribed or concretized into different materials 
(laws, products, skills). For practical purposes, this means that one needs 
to do the opposite of what the actors (inventors, entrepreneurs, manufac-
turers and so on) do: namely, to de-scribe inscriptions. To de-scribe is, as 
the verb suggests, to deconstruct what has formerly been constructed -
that is, to follow the work of inscription. 
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To summarize, I argue for the use of a different analytical language. A 
language of heterogeneous networks. A language that seeks to find regular-
ities in these networks. A language that tries to identify the practices that 
engender relatively strong, durable (or feeble, fleeting) enterprises, and the 
heterogeneous networks these practices de-scribe. A language that avoids 
asymmetrical and reductionist accounts. Favouring such a vocabulary, I 
suggest, has the definite advantage of offering a conception of process that 
takes account of contingency. Consequently, the explanations of small 
firms that emerge are necessarily of a 'one-off' character, and do not seek 
'patterns', 'trends' or 'general laws.' 
Conclusion 
Small firms are undoubtedly important because in most areas of the so-
called Third World they are thriving and provide employment for the 
largest part of the population. Their potential for sustained economic 
growth and welfare provision is now realized as never before. Indeed, 
réévaluations of small firms' contribution to development are presently 
high on the diverse agendas of development. Never before, then, has the 
task of understanding small firms - how they are shaped and how they 
shape development - been so urgent. The argument developed in this 
chapter represents one more step in addressing this urgent task. In stress-
ing the heterogenous nature of small-scale entrepreneurial projects, this 
chapter redirects attention to an often forgotten dimension of the debate 
on the role of small firms in development - namely that the technical or 
economic questions small firms confront are never narrowly technical or 
economic, just as the social or political problems they face are never 
narrowly social or political. 
A first general recommendation flowing from this chapter, then, is the 
not always obvious insight that it is difficult to formulate policies to 
support small-scale business through social, political, economic or technical 
incentives alone. Indeed, the more one ventures into actors' behaviour, 
the more one is confronted with complex relationships, and the less 
obvious it becomes to index action in specifically social, political, technical 
or economic terms. Hence, policies towards small firms should address the 
multidimensional character of action. Related to this, a second general 
recommendation is that schemes promoting small firms need to go beyond 
treating small-scale entrepreneurial projects as isolated, self-contained 
entities. Instead, they should be geared to the collectif of actors engaged in 
the production, dissemination, and consumption of specific goods and 
services. This is not without its problems, for one cannot generalize about 
collectifs: each one represents a specific and unique configuration of actors. 
Considering collectifs as loci for policy formulation thus calls for a 
different way of 'measuring' small firms. In 'measuring' the dynamics 
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and viability of small firms, I advanced a number of conceptual tools 
which may have policy implications. So, for example, could the tool kit 
used in this chapter be used to address such questions as: which small 
firms should be helped and how? These questions are not, however, 
neutral and hence the conceptual apparatus of actor-network theory is a 
double-edged weapon. Actor-network theory can show which enterprise 
forms are successful and thus worthy of political support, technical assist-
ance, credit programs, and so on. Such an interpretation would however 
pay lip service to liberal policies and supply-side economics. Symmetrical-
ly, the tool kit used in this thesis offers the possibility of detecting those 
enterprise forms which are unsuccessful, and thus aiding populist policies 
and demand-side economics in arguing for the protection and promotion 
of these firms, which are clearly not a part of the micro-entrepreneurial 
elite that knows how to take care of itself. The policy implications of actor-
network theory thus vary because these implications may mean different 
things to different policy makers, and involve a range of political, ethical 
and moral choices which cannot be resolved by means of any theoretical 
framework whatsoever. 
Notes 
1 See especially the flexible specialization literature on the Terza Italia (Becattini 1989; 
Brusco 1986), Baden Wurtemberg (Hausier 1992) and Scandinavia (Asheim 1992; 
Hàkansson 1989). 
2 Much has already been written on the way in which this object was constructed, and I will 
not repeat the argument here. See Escobar (1995) for an excellent (though to an extent 
generalizing) study of the depoliticized construction of the duo 'development' and 
'underdevelopment'. For more modest, ethnographically based examples, see Ferguson 
(1990) on Lesotho and de Vries (1997) on Costa Rica. 
3 The term 'informal sector' was introduced by Hart a year before the publication of the 
ILO report. See Hart (1973) for a fuller elaboration of the term. 
4 Subsequent fine-tuning of the model introduced the category of 'simple' or 'petty' 
commodity production. See MacEwen-Scott (1986, pp. 98-99) for a discussion of the 
difference between these concepts. 
5 Methodologically, the flexible specialization approach is very appealing because its general 
argument is that the strength of small-scale enterprise cannot be comprehended by 
examining individual firms. Rather, these firms are seen as organizations interacting 
within highly volatile, sometimes chaotic, but nevertheless identifiable networks. As 
Pedersen et al. argue (1994, p. 15), in these networks entrepreneurs associate with workers, 
traders and other participants in utilizing available and adaptable techniques, thus 
forming a collective production unit or 'meta-enterprise'. 
6 This essentialist idea underlies the writings of such disparate contemporary authors and 
institutions such as Schumpeter (1934), Rostow (1963), and the World Bank (1991). 
7 For the sake of brevity, I consider the commoditization thesis under this conceptual 
model. 
8 For important exceptions, see the work of Schumpeter (1934) and Polanyi et al. (1957). For 
more contemporary exceptions (of a social reductionist kind), see Granovetter (1985). 
9 In a sense, actor-network theory has much in common with some versions of systems 
theory (Hughes 1983). However, unlike systems theory, actor-network theory stresses that 
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the elements (including the entrepreneurs) bound together in networks are, at the same 
time, constituted and shaped in those networks. 
10 The notion of collectif as developed by Callon and Law (1995, p. 487) differs from that of 
collective or collectivity in that the former is not an assembly of people who have decided 
to join some form of common organization. Rather, a collectif is an emergent effect created 
by the interaction of the heterogeneous parts that make it up. In other words, it is the 
relations - and their heterogeneity - that are important, and not the things in themselves. 
The notion of collectif also retains the main idea of Callon's concept of techno economic 
network, which he defines as a 'coordinated set of heterogeneous actors . . . who partici-
pate collectively in the conception, development, production and distribution or diffusion 
of goods and services, some of which give rise to market transactions.' (1992, p. 73). 
11 Technological determinism is 'the theory that technology is indeed an independent 
factor, and that changes in technology cause social changes. In its strongest version, the 
theory claims that change in technology is the most important cause of change in 
society.' (MacKenzie and Wajcman (1985, p. 4). 
12 The position that technology is socially determined (e.g., Braverman 1974). 
13 See the articles in the volume edited by Pickering (1991) for a presentation and discussion 
of these. 
14 As Star (1991, p. 30) summarizes this battle, the British sociologists argue that there is, and 
should be, a moral divide between people and things, and that attempts to subvert this 
divide are dehumanizing. This position, of course, returns one to a primitive realism of 
the sort we had before science studies. The French, on the other hand, focus against 
'great divides', and seek a heuristic flattening of the differences between humans and 
non-humans in order to understand the way things work together. 
15 This line of thought, which is currently en vogue in much sociological writing, finds 
expression in Giddens' structuration theory. From an actor-network perspective, this 
theory is essentialist on two counts. First, the relations that are said to structure action, 
and which in turn are structured, are of a social character. This contradicts empirical 
evidence, which shows instead that every lengthening of a network in space and in time 
not only incorporates more and more humans, but also more and more non-humans. We 
may all be closely linked with Chilean kiwi producers, Japanese environmentalists or the 
struggle of Zapatista rebels. But take away the ships, the newspapers or the internet and 
time-space decompresses immediately. The second point is that Giddens' theory of 
structuration takes actors and structure to be given. This is basically an essentialist 
position - and a tautological one at that. 
16 'Global' does not necessarily mean geographically distant, and 'local' does not 
necessarily mean geographically close. 
17 And, in its absence, that of divergence. 
18 The courses of action that emerge from the issuance of a credit line cannot of course be 
determined a priori, but can only be decided by following the producer in his actual 
practice. 
19 It is important to note, however, that momentum is a relational characteristic: its outcome 
depends on the strategies that different actors may bring into play. 
20 Callon's attempt to bridge the gap between economics and sociology is certainly not the 
only one. See for example Vanberg (1994), who tries to associate the notion of norm- or 
rule-guided behaviour (homo sociologicus) on the one side, and that of rational, self-
interested choice (homo oeconomicus) on the other. In this example, the very absence of 
things or intermediaries in the definition of behaviour takes Vanberg into a completely 
different direction. 
21 Callon is quick to state that his solution for bridging economics and sociology is different 
from the notion of 'embeddedness' reactivated by Granovetter (1985), who sees 
networks as associations between humans only. 
22 A parallel of this position can be found in Daly (1991) who refers to the concept of radical 
relationalism. Radical relationalism advances the idea that 'nothing can be defined 
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independently, or outside a set of differential articulations.' To take the example of the 
identity of commodities, this would entail starting from the assumption that goods do not 
have an intrinsic, or essential, value (either in use or exchange terms), but that value is 
socially created in and through interactions (e.g., situations of exchange) involving 
different calculative domains (and this includes important interfaces between socially, 
politically and/or economically differentiated actors). The identity of any good will thus 
fully depend on how it is articulated with a set of categories and practices within a given 
situation. It is important to note that Daly connects the concept of relationalism with that 
of non-closure. By non-closure she suggests that the identity of any thing (or, for that 
matter, of any practice), 'can never be limited, or closed'; it can always be rearticulated 
within an alternative system of relational order. Thus for example the category of ' debt' 
may be constructed differently in a relational sequence involving compadre, 'brother', 
'friend', and so on than within a loosely aligned network that draws together banks, 
wholesale markets, anonymous buyers at a supermarket etc. 
23 Thus a seemingly 'simple' exchange encounter may disguise, blur, render invisible 
complex sets of relations - collective agents - made up of humans and non-humans. Here 
I emphasize 'may' because, at any moment, the relationships between the different 
elements making up the collective may be problematized, questioned - thus opening up 
all the complexities involved and calling for new rounds of translation. 
